Tackling Europe's most pressing infrastructure threats

For most of the past two decades, the main question for a European data centre was whether it could be built. Today a second question carries equal weight: will it keep running when something goes wrong? Recent events have made that question concrete for governments, defence organisations and the companies that depend on digital infrastructure.

The threat picture has changed

On 28 April 2025, Spain and Portugal lost power for up to ten hours. The final report of the expert panel commissioned by ENTSO-E describes a combination of factors, with the system's inability to control overvoltage at the centre of the cascade. Trains stopped, and internet and phone services failed across the peninsula.

In the Baltic Sea, at least eleven undersea cables were damaged between October 2023 and January 2025, prompting NATO to launch its Baltic Sentry mission to protect cables and pipelines. Deliberate sabotage has not been confirmed in every case, but the vulnerability is clear. In September 2025, drone sightings closed Copenhagen airport for several hours and disrupted military air bases in Denmark, with further sightings near critical sites in Norway, Sweden, Germany and Finland.

Regulation has followed. Under the EU Critical Entities Resilience Directive, member states had to identify critical entities, in sectors including energy, digital infrastructure and space, by 17 July 2026. Designated entities must then meet resilience obligations and report significant incidents within 24 hours. The NIS2 Directive already brings data centre service providers into the EU's cybersecurity regime.

Resilience starts with the site

Most resilience is decided before construction begins. Qore selects land where grid capacity is confirmed in writing by the system operator, preferably with access to more than one source of supply, and where on-site or adjacent generation and storage can be added. Site security, approach routes, separation from public infrastructure and diverse fibre routes are assessed at the same stage, before a design is fixed.

Designed for continuity

Facilities are designed for the continuity requirements of their users: redundant power and cooling, storage and generation to ride through grid disturbances, controlled access and perimeter protection, and, where the mission requires it, hardening against physical, drone and electromagnetic threats. For sovereign and defence-related workloads, ownership, operation and access governance remain within the required jurisdiction.

Trusted supply chains

Disruption to equipment supply is a resilience risk in its own right. Qore secures long-lead power and cooling equipment against the programme and works with established manufacturers and contractors. Its factory-built Qore Modular system allows capacity to be integrated and tested before it reaches site.

Operated by an accountable owner

Resilience is not a certificate issued at handover. As long-term owner, Qore remains accountable for operation, working with specialised facility management partners to defined standards, testing response procedures and preparing for the reporting obligations that critical entities now face.

What this means

For governments, defence organisations and critical industries, the question is no longer only where capacity is available. It is also who controls it and whether it will hold under pressure. Qore's answer is to treat security, resilience and sovereign control as design requirements from the first day of origination.